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NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
SUPERINTENDING POWER OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT OVER
COURTS OF APFEALS.-The Missouri system of appellate courts consists
of one Supreme Court and three Courts of Appeals. The jurisdiction of
the Courts of Appeals are prescribed by the Constitution and constitu-
tional amendments and statutes made in pursuance thereof.' Generally
speaking they have jurisdiction by appellate process of all civil cases, not
involving constitutional questions, where the amount in dispute exceeds
the sum of $7,500. Within the limits prescribed by the Constitution,
amendments, and statutes their jurisdiction is exclusive. There is no
appeal to the Supreme Court. The Constitution provides in certain
instances, however, that decisions be certified to the Supreme Court for
final adjudication, and also gives the Supreme Court a general superintend-
ing control over the Courts of Appeals by remedial writs. How effective
these provisions have been in securing a uniform line of decisions it will
be the object of this note to examine.
Section 6 of the constitutional amendment of 18842 provides: "When
any one of said Courts of Appeals shall in any cause or proceeding render
a decision which any one of the judges therein sitting shall deem contrary
to any previous decision of any one of said Courts of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court, the said Court of Appeals must, of its own motion, pending
the same term and not afterward, certify and transfer said cause or pro-
ceeding and the original transcript therein to the Supreme Court and
thereupon the Supreme Court must rehear and determine said cause or
proceeding, as in the case of jurisdiction obtained by ordinary appellate
process; and the last previous ruling of the Supreme Court on any question
of law or equity shall, in all cases, be controlling authority in said Courts
1. See Art. VI, § 12 of the Constitution of Missouri; also Art. VI. Amendment
1884, § 5; Revised Statutes 1909, § 3937; Laws of 1911, p. 190 (amending § 3937,
Revised Statutes 1909).
2. See Vol. 1, p. 101, Revised Statutes 1909.
(28)
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of Appeals." Section 3, Article 6 of the Constitution of 1875 provides:
"The Supreme Court shall have a general superintending control over all
inferior courts. It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari and other remedial writs, and to
hear and determine the same." Section 8 of the constitutional amendment
of 1864 provides: "The Supreme Court shall have superintending control
over the Courts of Appeals by mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari."
There have been several attempts by mandamus to compel the judges
of a Court of Appeals to certify cases to the Supreme Court on the ground
that one of the judges of the former court "deemed" its decision contrary
to a former decision of the Supreme Court. In the first of these cases,
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips,' it was held that, where it becomes the
duty of a Court of Appeals to certify to the Supreme Court, and they
fail to do so of their own motion during the term mandamus will lie.
However, it must be clear that one judge of the Court of Appeals in
question "deems" that its decision is in conflict with a former decision
of the Supreme Court, or of another Court of Appeals, and this must be
set out in a separate opinion. But in that case the court found that there
was not sufficient indication that any one of the judges of the Court of
Appeals deemed that the decision in the case was in conflict with a former
decision of the Supreme Court or of another Court of Appeals. State ex
rel. Giovanoni v. Rombauer,4 and State ex rel. Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Rom-
bauer5 were cases in which the Supreme Court was asked to issue writs
of mandamus to a Court of Appeals on the ground that the decisions
were in conflict with former decisions of the Supreme Court. The writs
were denied on the ground that it did not appear that any judge had suffi-
ciently indicated that he deemed that decision to be in conflict with former
decisions. In State ex rel. Third Nat. Bk. v. Smith' it was again attempted
to mandamus one of the Courts of Appeals. In this case one of the judges
of the Court of Appeals had written a dissenting opinion and cited former
decisions of the Supreme Court as being in conflict with the majority
opinion. But the Supreme Court refused the writ, saying that this was
not sufficient to indicate that this judge deemed the opinion from which
he dissented in conflict with citations made in his dissenting opinion. It
Vwill be seen that, although all four of these attempts at mandamus failed,
yet in all the court conceded that if one judge really "deems" the decision
in conflict with a former decision mandamus will lie to compel the Court
of Appeals, after the term has expired, to perform its duty and certify the
case to the Supreme Court. For a judge to sufficiently indicate that he
"deems" the decision of the majority in conflict with former decisions
he must, it seems, use the exact words of the Constitution, or words so
clear and unmistakable that they can be taken to have no other meaning.
In a later case the Supreme Court went to an extreme length in saying
that a judge of a Court of Appeals did not deem a decision in conflict
with former decisions. In that.case, Smith v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.7 the
Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for determination
but the Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction. In the opinion of
this case in the Court of Appeals Gill, J., said: "While concurring in the
foregoing opinion of Judge Ellison I feel doubtful of whether or not the
conclusion reached can be harmonized with Louisiana Nat. Bank v.
Lavieles * * * and therefore it is ordered certified to the Supreme
3. (1888) 96 Mo. 570.
4. (1894) 125 MO. 632.
5. (1897) 140 Mo. 121.
6. (1891) 107 Mo. 527.
7. (1897) 143 Mo. 33.
8. (1873) 52 Mo. 380.
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Court for its determination." The Supreme Court held that Judge Gill
had not sufficiently indicated that he "deemed" the decision in conflict
with a former decision of the Supreme Court. On the other hand in
Clark v. R. R.1 a motion to remand a case that had been certified to the
Supreme Court by a Court of Appeals on the ground that the decision of
the Court of Appeals was not really in conflict with former decisions was
overruled. The court said in that case that it was sufficient for purposes
of their jurisdiction that one of the judges deemed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in conflict with former decisions.'
The right to decide whether a particular decision is in conflict with a
former decision of the Supreme Court or of another Court of Appeals has
in several cases been conceded by the Supreme Court to the judges of the
Courts of Appeals themselves." In State ex rel. Hobart v. Smith" it was
attempted by certiorari to review a decision of the Kansas City Court of
Appeals on the ground that that court had not followed the last previous
ruling of the Supreme Court. In the opinion of the Supreme Court it
was said: "It is not for us to say, nor do we say, whether or not the
Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusions; but whether right or
wrong the case is not before us for review." Certiorari is said to reach
only errors appearing on the face of the record which are jurisdictional
in their nature, and if the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction its decisions
cannot be reviewed by certiorari." In the case of M. K. & T. Ry. v.
Smith", however, it was said that the Court of Appeals, although having
jurisdiction generally of a case might exceed its jurisdiction on any par-
ticular point, and that such error would be reviewed by certiorari. In
Manning v. Smith" a Court of Appeals attempted to enter final judgment
on an appeal from an order dissolving a temporary injunction. The
Supreme Court on certiorari proceedings in that case said that the Court
of Appeals, though having jurisdiction generally of the appeal from the
order dissolving a temporary injunction, exceeded its jurisdiction in render-
ing final judgment on the Appeal.
The case of Curtis v. Sexton has had a long and varied legal career. It
came first to the Supreme Court on appeal in 1906"1 and the court on that
appeal held that there was evidence to go to the jury. A new trial of the,
case was had and a verdict found for the plaintiff. In the meantime thejurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals had been changed from cases involving
$2500 to $7500 and on second appeal the case went to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals.'7 That court in disposing of the case upon substantially
the same testimony ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to go to
the jury and that the defendant's demurrer to the evidence should have
been sustained. The Supreme Court thereafter in the case of State .ex
rel. v. Broaddus" on certiorari proceedings quashed the judgment of the
Kansas City Court of Appeals. This was on the ground that the Court of
9. (1911) 179 Mo. 66, 72.
10. Mandamus will lie from the Supreme Court to compel the Courts of Appeals
to exercise their lawful jurisdiction. State ex rel. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Smith(1903) 172 Mo. 446; Stanberry v. Smith (1903) 172 Mo. 618; State ex rel. Hyatt v.
Smith (1891) 105 Mlo. 6; State ex rel. v. Broaddus (1907) 210 Mo. 1. Prohibition will
also lie to prevent the Courts of Appeals from exercising jurisdiction of cases in which
they have no jurisdiction. M. K. & T. R. R. Co. v. Smith (1899) 154 Mo. 300.
11. State ex rel. v. Broaddus (1907) 207 Mo. 107; Railroad v. Smith (1899) 154
Mo. 300.
12. (1903) 173 Mo. 398.
13. State ex rel. Teasdale v. Smith (1890) 101 Mo. 174.
14. (1899) 154 Mo. 300.
15. (1905) 188 Mo. 167.
16. 201 Mo. 217.
17. (1909) 142 Mo. App. 179.
18. (1912) 238 Mo. 189.
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Appeals in overruling a decision of the Supreme Court in the same case
was exceeding its jurisdiction. It was said in that case that as to the
point on which the Supreme Court had ruled the case was res adjudicata
and that when the court passed upon a point in a case that it became the
"law of that case." The case on motion was removed to the Supreme
Court in pursuance of an act of the Legislature providing for cases not
disposed of at the time the change was made in the jurisdiction of the
Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court on the last appeal in Curtis v.
Sexton 19 was asked to reconsider its decision in the same case reported
under the style of State ex rel. v. Broaddus,0 but they reaffirmed the posi-
tion taken in that case. The point of interest to us is the position taken
in State ex. rel. v. Broaddus2" and reiterated in the latest appeal to the
Supreme Court under the style of Curtis v. Sexton,2 that certiorari would
lie to'review the judgment of a Court of Appeals when in conflict with
a former decision of the Supreme Court in the same case although none of
the judges of the Court of Appeals deems that there is such a conflict.
The case is put entirely on the grounds that a ruling in the same case by
the Supreme Court is res adjudicata23 or the "law of the case"2 4 and
that for the Court of Appeals to overrule it is an excess of jurisdiction
which will be reviewed by certiorari. The case is of little value as a prec-
edent as it will seldom happen that a case will go to the Court of Appeals
on second appeal after having once been in the Supreme Court but the
case contains a dictum which is worthy of note. Faris, J., in the course
of the opinion says: "It may well be that our only power of enforcing the
provisions of the last clause of said section 6,2- and of making to wit, 'the
last previous ruling of the Supreme Court on any question of law or equity
* * * be controlling authority in said Courts of Appeals,' is derived
from the broad power of 'superintending control' given by section 8 of
this amendment." A case of recalcitration, which has never arisen and
will perhaps never arise, but which is readily supposable, might come up
in which any one or more of the Courts of Appeals would utterly refuse
to follow this court or to follow one another; absent the power of super-
intending control somewhere lodged, there would then be four Supreme
Courts instead of one-a thing unthinkable." It is submitted that this is
in direct conflict with the class of cases represented by State ex rel. Hobart
v. Smith27 in which it is held that the question of whether a decision of
a Court of Appeals is in conflict with a former decision of the Supreme
Court or of another Court of Appeals is one for the judges of the Court of
Appeals in which the decision is rendered.
Following out the dictum of Faris, J., above, there would seem to be
no objection to saying that wherever the Court of Appeals renders a
decision in conflict with former decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri
it exceeds its jurisdiction and that such excess of jurisdiction will, of
course, be a question for the Supreme Court in certiorari proceedings.
This would open the Supreme Court to a flood of cases and further clog
their notably congested docket. But it is submitted that it would be
better to allow this, and to increase the size of the Supreme Court rather
19. (1913) 159 S. W. 512.
20. 1912) 238 Mo. 189.
21. , 2Mpra.
22. Supra.
23. Ma v. Crawford (1899) 150 Mo. 504, 524; Gracey v. St. Louis (1900) 221
Mo. 165; Wells on Res Adjudicata and Stare Decisls, § 613.
24. For an interesting criticism of the doctrine of "The Law of the Case," see
67 Central Law Jour. 225; 34 L. R. A. 321-347 and cases cited.
25. Constitutional Amendment 1884 supra.
26. Ibid.
27. Supra.
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than to have bodies of localized law growing up within our state. How-
ever it is to be noted that the remedy suggested by Faris, J., would be
effective only in bringing about uniformity of decisions between the
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, and that it would not be
effective to bring about a uniformity of decisions as between the Courts
of Appeals themselves. ' s  M.W.
LIABILITY FOR INJURY RESULTING FROM EFFORT TO SAVE LIFE
ENDANGERED BY DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.-In negligence cases due
care is defined as "that care which an ordinarily prudent and reasonable
person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances." '
Breach of the duty to use such care is negligence,2 and gives rise to a right
of action in the person who thereby sustains injuries to recover for those
injuries of which such negligence was the proximate cause, in the absence
of contributory negligence or other valid defense.3
The proximate cause of an event has been defined as "that which in
a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause produces
that event, and without which that event would not have occurred." 4
Cases where the problem has been viewed from another angle-that of
consequence rather than of cause-adopt a slightly different definition
of liability for injuries due to negligence-as, for instance, that, "A
person charged with negligence may be held liable for anything which
after the injury is complete, appears to have been a natural and probable
consequence of his act."' Broaddus, P. J., in Boyce v. Railway.6 reviews and
comments upon previous definitions as follows: "I am free to say that the
definition of proximate cause * * * is unfortunate and tends to
create confusion in its applica'tion in many cases. Properly speaking
proximate cause means a cause that immediately precedes and produces
an effect, as distinguished from the remote, mediate or predisposing
cause."
Although the relationship which must exist between defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's injury may be expressed in these different ways,
an examination of the Missouri cases shows that two elements are essential
to a recovery: (a) A direct chain of causal connection between the negligent
act and the injury; and (b) the absence of any independent, efficient,
intervening cause.' Therefore, the doctrine of proximate cause as
28. As this issue goes to press proceedings are pending in the Supreme Court
which will have important bearing on the subject under discussion, and which will
be noticed in the next issue.
1. Halsbury, Laws of England § 630a, and cases cited; Railway Company v.
Barrett (1896) 166 U. S. 619; Tetherow v. Ry. Co. (1888) 98 Mo. 74: Cohn v. City of
Kansas (1891) 108 Mo. 387; Reardon v. Ry. Co. (1892) 114 Mo. 384; Stanley v. Ry. Co.(1892) 114 Mo. 608; Lloyd v. Ry. Co. (1895) 128 Mo. 595; Felver v. Ry. (1908) 216
Mo. 195, 207, where Lamm, P. J. says: "This definition may be said through venerable
age and much use to have reached the dignity of a maxim."
2. Blyth v. The Co. (1856) 11 Exch. 781; R. R. Co. v. Jones (1877) 9515. S. 441;
Wilkins v. Ry. Co. (1890) 101 Mo. 93; MacMahon v. ExpressCo.(1895)132 Mo. 641;
Dean v. R. R. (1906) 199 Mo. 386, 408.
3. Ry. v. Kellogg (1876) 94 U. S. 475; McDonald v. Ry. (1908) 219 Mo. 468;
Blair v. By. (1886) 89 Mo. 334; Morgan v. Cox 22 Mo. 373; Stanley v. Ry. (1892)
114 Mo. 606.
4. Sherwood, 3., In Hudson v. Ry. (1890) 101 Mo. 13. See also 15 Harvard
Law Review 546, and cases cited note 3, supra; Am. and Eng. Ann. Cas., p. 436, note
3, and cases cited; Dixon v. Ry. (1894) 124 Mo. 140, 149; 32 Cyc. 745, note 77.
5. Lam i, P. J., in MacDonald v. Railroad (1908) 219 Mo. 468, 491; In Ander-
son v. Miller (Tenn. 1895) 33 S. W. 615, it Is said that, "The definitions of the term
'proximate cause] are easily given In general terms, but they are very difficult In
practical application to the facts of each particular case."
6. (Mo. App.,1906)96 S. W. 670, 671. It is curious that by accident or design
this part of the opinion Is omitted from the report in 120 Mo. App. 168.
7. Harlan v. Ry. (1877) 65 Mo. 22, 25; Powell v. Ry. (1882) 76 Mo. 80; Henry
v. Ry. (1882) 76 Mo. 288; Stepp v. Ry. (1884) 85 Mo. 229; Hudson v. Ry, (1890) 101
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adopted in Missouri, although the language in all cases is not reconcilable,
seems to set the same limits to liability and recovery whether it is in fact
expressed in terms of cause, or whether it is expressed in terms of conse-
quence. This being true the language used in the recent case of Williams
v. United States Incandescent Lamp Co.' seems unfortunate and likely
to lead to confusion. In that case the plaintiff was employed as a char-
woman by the defendants, who operated a factory for the manufacture
of incandescent lamps. They had provided a stove to heat the place,
and the proof showed that it had been negligently put up. As a result
of this negligence the pipe fell and destruction of the building by fire
seemed imminent, as the building was stored with highly combustible
material used in the manufacture of lamps. The plaintiff saw that she
and her fellow-employees, of whom about thirty were in adjoining rooms,
were in great peril. She picked up the pipe and stepped upon a chair,
attempting to replace the pipe and avert the disaster. While she was in
this position, and endeavoring to 'Push the pipe together, she fell back-
wards, striking against a desk, and sustained the injuries of which she
complained. Plaintiff had a verdict, and appeal was perfected to the
Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment, Reynolds, P. J., stating
the rule governing such a case as follows: "The negligence which puts a
fellow-being in peril of life or limb is usually held to be the proximate
cause of injury to one who attempts in a prudent manner, to rescue the
person in danger."
We do not object to the result, which is certainly desirable, for
"Sentiments of humanity applaud the act of the plaintiff, the law com-
mends it, and if not extremely rash or reckless, awards the rescuer
redress for injuries received, without weighing with technical precision
the rules of contributory negligence or assumption of risk."' This view
has received frequent approval in this country.', But we think the
theory upon which that result is reached is unfortunate. It seems in-
consistent with the conception of proximate cause accepted in Missouri,"
which insists upon the absence of an intervening efficient cause, for, in
cases of which the case under discussion is a fair example, that intervening
cause will always be present. No one would contend that the act of the
plaintiff here was involuntary. It can, therefore, only serve to add to
the confusion surrounding our ideas of proximate cause, which confusion
Broaddus, J., so justly condemns, while the same desirable result has
been reached in other cases without so stretching the doctrine of proximate
cause.
12
The cases, last cited, proceed upon the theory that, although the
plaintiff voluntarily subjects himself to the dangers of the defendant's
negligence, he does not lose his right to recovery for injuries he sustains
therefrom, since his purpose was one which the law regards with approval
-the saving of human life. The rule is strictly limited to this class of
cases and is based upon considerations of policy. Had the purpose of
the plaintiff been to save property he could not have recovered. 3 "It
Mo. 13; Dickson v. Ry. (1894) 124 Mo. 140; Harrison v. Kansas City Co. (1906) 195
Mo. 629; Dean v. Ry. (1906) 199 Mo. 411; Buckner v. Stockyards Co. (1909) 221 Mo.
700.
8. (1913) 157 S. W. 130.
9. Brown, J., in Perpich v. Mining Co. (Minn., 1912) 137 N. W. 12.
10. Eckert v. Long Island Ry. (1871) 43 N. Y. 502; Linnehan v. Sampson (1879)
126 Mass. 506; Donahoe v. Ry. (1884) 83 Mo. 560; Penn. Co. v. Langendorff (Ohio,
1891) 28 N. E. 172; Gibney v. State (N. Y., 1893) 33 N. E. 142; 1. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl(1896) 48 Neb. 553; Corbin v. Philadelphia (Pa., 1900) 45 At. 1070.
11. See note 8, supra.
12. Eckert v. Long Island 1. R., supra; Donahoe v. Ry., supra; R. R. Co. v.
Krayenbuhl, supra.
13. Morris v. Ry. (1896) 148 N. Y. 182, citing Eckert v. Ry., supra; Burdick's
Law of Torts, p. 438, note 78, and cases cited.
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is to be observed that it is only when the railroad company is about to
strike a person in danger through its negligence, that a third person can
voluntarily expose himself to peril in an effort to rescue such person, and
recover for an injury sustained in such attempt."1 4
These cases frankly recognize the doctrine, which allows a recovery
under the circumstances above described, as an exception to the general
rule requiring that defendant's negligence be the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury, such exception being dictated by considerations of
public policy.' 6 This method of dealing with the subject seems preferable
to that of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Williams v. Incandescent
Lamp Co., 6 where, as we have seen, the court reaches a similar result, but
attempts to justify it as an application of the proximate cause rule.
Sometimes proximate cause is given a broader definition than that
which has been generally acceptbd in Missouri, as, for instance, "an
unbroken connection between the defendant's wrongful act and the
plaintiff's injury, so that the injury was a result naturally and reasonably
to be expected, either as the sole consequence of that and other causes
which might reasonably have been expected to be set in motion by it, or
to act in concurrence with it."1 Under this definition defendant's negli-
gence in the principal case was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury,
but it would also have been the proximate cause, under this definition, if
plaintiff had intervened, let us say, to save his own property, and yet we
have seen that recovery is nowhere allowed under such circumstances.
So that the formulation of a definition of proximate cause broad enough
to cover the principal case leads to a definition which lacks definiteness
and precision, and to which also exceptions must at once be made.
G. C. W., Jr.
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR PHYSICAL INJURY TO PLAINTIFF'S Hus-
BAND.-At common law a physical injury to the wife constituted two
legal wrongs.' There was a right of action in the wife for the injury
itself. She could not sue alone and her husband joined in the action keep-
ing the proceeds. 2 There was a second right of action and this was in
the husband alone.A His damages were largely measured by the loss of
his wife's services and by expenses incurred, but he recovered also for
loss of her society and comfort, known as the right of consortium. These
two actions in the wife and husband were entirely distinct, and a recovery
for one did not bar a recovery for the other.'
But physical injury to the wife was not necessary to give the husband
a right of action. A husband was entitled to exclusive intercourse with
his wife, and the invasion of this right gave rise to a cause of action for
criminal conversation.' Obviously here the loss of consortium constituted
14. Henry, J., In Donahoe v. Ry. (1884) 83 Mo. 560, 563.
15. Other exceptions dictated by similar considerations are the rule as to cons-
mon carriers, recognized in many cases, that the defense of act of God cannot be
pleaded where the carrier's negligence has given an occasion for natural causes to
operate to plaintiff's injury, Nugent v. Smith (1876) 1 C. P. D. 423, Vail v. Ry. (1876)
63 Mo. 230; Gleeson v. R. R. (1891) 140 U. S. 435; 3 Columbia Law Review 484; and
the rule embodied in the English Sales of Goods Act, § 20, and the proposed American
Sales Act, § 22 (b), to the effect that where delivery has been delayed through the
fault of either buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards
any loss which might not have occurred except for such fault.
16. Supra.
17. Burdick's Law of Torts (3d ed.) p. 110.
1. Smith v. St. Joseph (1874) 55 Mo. 456.
2. McKinney v. Western Stage Co. (1857) 4 Ia. 420; Schouler on Husband and
Wife, § 140.
3. Russell v. Come (1703) 2 Ld. Raymond 103; Smith v. St. Joseph, supra;
Schouler on Husband and Wife, § 143.
4. Smith v. St. Joseph, supra; Mann v. Rich Hill (1888) 28 Mo. App. 497.
5. 21 Cyc. 1626, and cases cited.
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the entire injury. There was no loss of services. Another instance of
actionable injury was enticing away the wife. Here there was a loss of
services, but the enticing away was the primary ground.' Also the
right of action for alienation of affection, which has been frequently
recognized, is not based at all upon loss of services, nor is it necessary that
the wife shall have left her home. 7
The wife at common law had no corresponding right of action either
where there was a physical injury to the husband or for criminal conversa-
tion or enticing away the husband.' Her identity was considered as merged
in that of her husband, and thus she was denied these actions. And in cases
of criminal conversation and alienation of affection there was the additional
ground for refusing, that the husband would be allowed in effect to recover
for his own wrong.
Then came the Married Women's Acts, generally, as in Missouri,
giving the wife her own earnings and the right to bring action alone for
any injury which "has grown out of any violation of her personal rights." 9
The statutes have been held not to affect the husband's right of action
for criminal conversation and alienation of affection.' 0 On the other
hand it was early held that such statutes either vest similar rights of action
in the wife, or give her the privilege of enforcing such rights which previous-
ly existed but were unenforceable. The reasons for formerly denying
these rights of action no longer exist. So it has been held that the wife
has a cause of action for the loss of consortium caused by the criminal
conversation of another with her husband." And so in alienation of
affection suits brought by wives recovery has been allowed for loss of
support and consortium."
In cases of physical injury the conception of an injury to the wife
constituting two wrongs generally still survives and the husband has a
right of action for loss of consortium." This is true in Missouri where it
is held that the husband still is entitled to domestic services though the
wife is entitled to the earnings of her separate labor."4 In a very few
jurisdictions it is held that, the Married Women's Acts having taken
away all right of service from the husband he no longer has an action for
loss of consortium where his wife receives physical injury"5-a result that
seems difficult to sustain on principle. Where the husband can recover
for the loss of consortium it is clear he need not be deprived entirely of
his wife's society. In Furnish v. Mo. Pac. R. Co.,'0 the court said, "But
the answer to the first contention is that as her husband he was entitled
to her society as she was when the negligence of the defendant impaired
her strength, her health, and her usefulness as a helpmate."
There are also several cases, other than those dealing with alienation
of affection and criminal conversation, where the wife has been allowed
to recover for loss of consortium and support, caused by defendant's
6. Tiffany's Persons and Domestic Relations 75 to 78.
7. Adams v. Main 3 Ind. App. 232; Rinehart v. Bills (1884) 82 Mo. 534.
8. Doe v. Roe (1890) 82 Me. 503; 21 Cyc. 1512.
9. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8309.
10. Cross v. Grant (1883) 62 N. H. 675; Hartpence v. Rogers (1898) 143 Mo.
623; De Ford v. Johnson (1911) 152 Mo. App. 209.
11. Noland v. Pearson (1906) 191 Mass. 283.
12. Bennett v. Bennett (1889) 116 N. Y. 584; O'Gorman v. Pfeiffer (1911) 130
N. Y. Sup. 77; Claw v. Chapman (1894) 125 Mo. 101; Nichols v. Nichols (1898) 147
Mo. 387.
13. 21 Cyc. 1525, and cases cited.
14. Womach v. St. Joseph (1007) 201 Mo. 467; Elliott v. Kansas City (1908)
210 Mo. 576, 582; Kirkpatrick v. Railway Co. (1908) 129 Mo. App. 524.
15. Bolger v. Boston Elevated R. Co. (1910) 205 Mass. 420: Marri v. Stanford
Street R. Co. (1911) 84 Conn. 9. But see contra: Garrison v. Sun Printing Co. (N. Y.,
1912) 150 App. Div. 689, aff'd. 207 N. Y. 1.
16. (1890) 102 Mo. 669.
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wilful act. Handermeyer v. Cooper 7 was a case in which the wife was
allowed to recover for loss of support and consortium where the husband
drove her away as a result of the slander of defendant. In Westlake v.
Westlake18 the wife recovered where the defendant, over the wife's protest,
sold morphine to the husband, who was addicted to its use. In our own
state in Clark v. Hill"a the wife was allowed recovery for loss of support
and consortium where the defendant by persistent threats drove the
husband insane.
For a good many years no action reached an appellate court in which
the wife sued for loss of consortium resulting from a negligent injury to
the husband. Forty years after the wife was granted her action for
personal torts in New York the action of Goldman v. Cohen20 was brought
on this theory of recovery. The court said little more than that the
wife's interest in her husband's life and companionship is not a property
interest, that actions were permitted in the case of wilful injury merely
as a matter of punishment and that there being no precedent the action
could not lie. The subsequent cases in the United States on this point
are very few in number and all have refused to allow recovery. 21
In this state the point recently came up almost simultaneously in
the Kansas City and St. Louis Courts of Appeals in Stout v. K. C. Teiminal
Co.22 and Gambina v. Coal & Coke Co.2" in each of which the plaintiff wife
sought to recover for loss of consortium caused by negligent injury to the
husband. It is not surprising that each court refused to allow the action
inasmuch as no attempt had ever been made before in Missouri to maintain
such an action. However it seems difficult to appreciate the reasoning
of the courts.
The case of Stout v. K. C. Terminal Co, is the more fully considered.
The main ground there for refusing the action to the wife is that the
husband's right to recover for loss of consortium is based on his right to
his wife's services. Marri v. Stamford24 is cited on this point. The
court there does make that contention but cites no authority. That
case came to the conclusion that neither husband nor wifecould maintain
an action for loss of consortium, "whether the allowance was for loss of
what is termed service or society or both." In this it is undoubtedly not
followed-certainly not in Missouri. The authorities seem to give little
countenance to the assertion that the husband's right to recover for loss
of society of the wife was dependant on his right to her services. Of
course there is no escape from the fact that the husband had and has the
right to his wife's services, and that physical injury to the wife deprived
the husband of services as well as of consortium, but on the other hand
we have seen that there were actions (e.g. alienation of affection and
criminal conversation) in which the husband was allowed to recover for
loss of consortium only.
The court further argues that for a mere impairment of society there
is no recovery, but is this not conclusively answered by the many cases,
of which Furnish v. Mo. Pac. R. Co.2 5 is an example, in which the husband
is said to be entitled to the society of the wife as she was before the injury?
The court also argues that the damages to the wife are remote, but finds
17. (1912) 25 Ohio St. 327.
18. (1878) 34 Ohio St. 621.
19. (1897) 69 Mo. App. 541
20. (1900) 63 N.Y. Supp.459.
21. Fenoff v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co. (1009) 203 Mass. 278; Brown v. Kistlernan
(Ind., 1912) 98 N. E. 631.
22. (1913) 157 S. W. 1019.
23. (1913) 158 S. W. 77.
24. (1911) 84 Conn. 9.
25. (1890) 102 Mo. 669.
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that ground rather unsatisfactory, saying: "But as the reasoning as to
remoteness of claim may not be wholly in harmony with that allowing the
husband an action notwithstanding the married women's statute for loss
of her services and society, it may be more satisfactory, in order to avoid
an inconsistency, to put the ground of denial of the wife's action on the
fact that, having no legal claim for damages for loss of the husband's
services with which to connect a loss of conjugal affection and, social
comfort, it leaves these nonpecuniary rights standing as her sole cause of
action based on what has been termed the sentimental side or character
of rights, rights more in the nature of a consortium which, standing alone,
has never been regarded as capable of pecuniary estimate."
The basis of the decision of Gambino v. Coal & Coke Co. is this ad-
mittedly weak argument of remoteness but just why this is not true
where the husband sues for loss of society and comfort is not made clear.
The court recognized the fact that it is difficult to reconcile this holding
with the case of Clark v. Hill, supra, in which the wife recovered where
the husband was driven insane. Reynolds, J., in a separate concurring
opinion, said that Clark v. Hill should be overruled. However Clark v.
Hill is consistent with the other cases involving this point as is shown
herein above. A. ].
SALE OF PART OF A MAss.-Three things are essential to a sale as
distinguished from a contract to sell-namely, an ascertained, existing
subject-matter,' a present intention to pass title,2 and an agreed price. 3
The intention to pass title may be expressly stated, or there may be
certain facts that give rise to a presumption that there was a certain
intention. 4 To arrive at the intention of the parties, we must look at
the terms of the contract, conduct of parties and the circumstances in
each case.' This question is one of fact, and hence one generally for the
jury.6 But certain presumptions have come to be generally accepted as
aids to the determination of the parties' intention. One of them is that
where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, but the vendor is
to do something to put them in a deliverable state, the parties do not
intend to pass title to the goods, in their existing condition, but to the
goods after they have been changed.' But an expressed intention con-
trary to such presumption overrides it.'
In conformity to the rule that for a present sale there must be an
ascertained and existing subject-matter it is held that there cannot be a
present sale of goods to be procured, or to be manufactured by the vendor.9
1. English Sales of Goods Act, § 16; American Uniform Sales Act, § 17; Hamilton
v. Clark (1887) 25 Mo. App. 428; Allgear v. Walsh (1887) 24 Mo. App. 134; Benedict
& Burhnam M'f'g Co. v. Jones (1895) 64 Mo. App. 218, 223.
2. English Sales of Goods Act, § 17; American Uniform Sales Act § 18; Ogg v.
Shuter (1875) L. R. 10 0. P. 159; Ober v. Carson (1876) 62 Mo. 209, 214, where Wagner,
J., said that. "the question of transfer to, and vesting title in, the purchaser, always
involves an inquiry into the intention of the contracting parties; and it is to be ascer-
tained whether their negotiations and acts show an intention on the part of the seller
to relinquish all further claim as owner and on the part of the buyer to assume such
control with all liabilities" England v. Mortland (1877) 3 Mo. App. 490; Kirkely &
Gundestrup Seed Co. v. White (1913) 168 Mo. App. 626. For an exhaustive collection
of authority see 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7.
3. English Sales of Goods Act, § 8; American Uniform Sales Act, § 9; Stout v.
Caruthersville Hardware Co. (1908) 131 Mo. App. 520.
4. Ober v. Carson, supra.
5. Kirkely & Gunestrup Seed Co. v. White (1913) 168 Mo. App. 628, 635.
6. Williston on Sales, § 262; Merchant's National Bank of Cincinnati v. Bangs
(1869) 102 Mass. 291; Clark v. Shannon & Mort Co. (1902) 117 Iowa 645.
7. Graff v. Belche (1876) 62 Mo. 400 (oats to be threshed); English Sales of
Goods Act, § 18, Rule 2; American Uniform Sales Act, § 19, Rule 2.
8. Beck & Corbet Iron Co. v. Holbeck (1904) 109 Mo. App. 179, 185.
9. American Uniform Sales Act, § 5 (3). and § 76 (1) containing definition of
"future goods"; Bennet v. Platt (1830) 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 558; English Sales of Goods
Act, § 5 (3), and § 62 (1) containing definition of "future goods."
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But less simple problems are presented when the parties use words of
present sale with regard to a certain number of unseparated units of a
larger mass. And in dealing with these problems we must distinguish
between the cases where the goods in the mass are fungible," and where
they are not.
The English view of such a transaction is that title cannot pass even
when the goods are fungible." English courts construe such a contract
literally, and say that the parties intended the passing of title to specific
units of the mass; that, so long as there is no separation, the vendee
cannot point out any specific units, of which he is owner; and that it is
essential to the sale that the goods be individualized in order that the
right of property may attach to a specific chattel.- Granted the premise
that the intention of the parties was the passing of title to specific units,
the English courts are correct in their conclusion that there is no sale.
Missouri and some other American states follow this view."
A different view prevails in some states when the contract has to eo
with fungible goods."3  The leading case of Kimberly v. Patchin" estab-
lishes the American doctrine that a title does pass when the parties purport
to sell and buy a certain number of units of a uniform mass. The courts
that follow this view construe the contract liberally, and try to give it
an intelligent meaning. The American docrtine recognizes that it is
impossible to transfer title to specific units in such a case, but that it is
possible, by treating the buyer as tenant in common with the seller, to
convey to him an undivided share of the mass equal to the number of
units named. It seems no doubt the intention of the parties that, "The
vendee was to have the same right to the ten tons [the units named] that
the vendor retained in the remaining thirty tons; and conceding such to
have been the intention of the parties to the contract, why should the
law disappoint that intention by an arbitrary rule of law against it?""
The difference between the American and the English views is in their
interpretation of the intention of the parties. The courts which follow
the English view refuse to consider it the intention to transfer a fractional
part and make buyer and seller tenants in common. They recognize
that there can be a tenancy in common where there has been a confusion
of goods,1 and where goods of the same quality have been separated and
poured back into the mass. 17 In the latter case they hold title passed
on separation and cannot be divested by subsequent remingling. And the
possibility of persons becoming tenants in common of personal property
by the conveyance of a part interest is recognized by the English law, 8
but English courts strictly construe the contract where it says a sale of a
certain quantity, holding that the parties intended a transfer of title to
that quantity, and did not intend a tenancy in common to be created.
It is clear that courts following the English doctrine just discussed
would refuse to recognize, as constituting a present sale, a contract which
10. Defined in American Uniform Sales Act, § 76, as "goods of which any unit
is from its nature or by mercantile usage treated as the equivalent of any other unit."
11. Busk v. Davis (1814) 2 M. & S. 39: Gillet v. Hill (1834) 2 Cromp. & M. 530.
12. Adam Roth Grocer Co. v. Clements (1896) 69 Mo. App. 446; American Metal
Co. v. Daugherty (1907) 204 Mo. 71; Com. Bank v. Gillette (1883) 90 Ind. 268; Scudder
v. Worster (1853) 65 Mass. (11 Cush) 573.
13. Hurf v. Hires (1878) 40 N. J. L. (11 Vroom) 581; Waldron v. Chase (1854)
37 Me. 414.
14. (1859) 19 N. Y. 330; American Uniform Sales Act, § 6, codifies the doctrine
of this case.
15. Chapman v. Shepard (1872) 39 Conn. 413, 422.
16. Spence v. Union Marine Insurance Co. (1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 427.
17. Aldridge v. Johnson (1857) 7 E. & B. 885: Graff v. Belche (1876) 62 Mo.
400; Henderson v. Fauch (1853) 21 Pa. (9 Harris) 359.
18. Litt., § 321: Williams on Personal Property (16th ed.) 415; Goodeve on
Personal Property (5th ed.) 9.
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purported to pass title to a certain number of units mixed in a mass
composed of units of different kinds. All American courts also refuse to
recognize such a contract as constituting a present sale, because it is
not to be supposed that the vendee intended to become tenant in common
of such nonfungible mass, but it is rather to be supposed that he intended
to have the units described in his contract separated from the mass before
taking title to them.' 9
In the recent Missouri case of Langsdorff v. Meyers el a. 2 0 the vendor
sold his crop of fall and winter apples of grades number one and number
two, and the vendee was to gather and grade them. The question was
whether the title passed before the apples were gathered. It was held
that title had not passed. The decision seems to be sound and accord
with the foregoing principles.. According to either the American or the
English view of the sale of part of a uniform mass, the decision would be
the same, because this is not a sale of part of a uniform mass, as contended
by the plaintiff. It was a contract to sell part of a mass of dissimilar
units. The court in its opinion says, " * * defendants were not to
take a part of a larger mass of exactly like kind. They were to select a
part of a larger mass of unequal quality, and until selection the title does
not pass." W. B.
QUASI CONTRACTUAL REcoVERY FOR SERVICES RENDERED UNDER
A BROKEN CONTRACT.-There is much difference of opinion as to what,
if any, compensation shall be paid to one who has performed some service
to the benefit of another, but who, either through his own wilful act or the
wilful act of his employer, has failed to comply fully with the requirements
on which he has agreed his compensation shall depend.
When the servant wilfully abandons his employment without just
cause, it seems that he should be refused any compensation for the work
he has done. He has seen fit to define his rights to compensation by the
terms of a contract with his master, and should be required to comply
with his contract in order to entitle himself to any compensation. The
law should not raise a new obligation on the part of a master to pay his
servant for part performance, when the servant has it in his power to
comply with the contract and entitle himself to compensation under it.
The rule in England has always been that there could be no recovery by
the servant who wilfully breaches his contract.' Although such a rule
is not universally followed in this country, it is followed by a majority
of American jurisdictions.2 The case of Britton v. Turners represents
the other view. That case allowed a recovery to the extent of the benefit
derived by the master less any damage to the master because of plaintiff's
breach. The case has won the approval of the courts of several states.4
which consider that this rule more nearly does justice than the strict
English rule. But, justice should not demand that a new remedy be
created for a servant who has a complete remedy on his contract by
fulfiling its terms. Such creation of a new remedy would be in direct
19. Hutchinson v. Hunter (1847) 7 Pa. (Barr) 140: Foot v. Marsh (1873)
51 N. Y. 288; Burdick on Sales (3d ed.) 54; Williston on SaJes, § 159.
20. (1913.) 157 S. W. 85.
1. Sinclair v. Bowles (1829) 9 B. & C. 92; Spain v. Arnott (1817) 2 Starkie 256;
Turner v. Robinson (1833) 6 0. & P. 15; Amor v. Fearon (1839) 9 A. & E. 548; Turner
v. Mason (1845) 14 M. & W. 116.
2. Housell v. Erickson (1862) 28 IlI. 257; Swanzy v. Moore (1859) 22 111. 63;
Henderson v. Stile (1853) 14 Ga. 135; Stark v. Parker (Mass., 1824) 1 Pick. 2.67;
Jennings v. Camp (N. Y. 1816) 13 John 94; Abernathy v. Black (Tenn., 1865) 2
Coldw. 314,3. (1834) 6 N. H. 481.
4. Purcell v. McComber (1881) 11 Neb. 209; Dunbar v. Baker (1878) 21 Kan.
99; Pixlee v. Nichols (1859) 8 Iowa 106; Riggs v. Horde (1860) 25 Tex. (Supp.) 456.
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opposition to the agreement of the parties. Further, the doctrine of
Britton v. Turner has a tendency to encourage wilful breaches of contract,
a thing the courts should try to discourage.
Where the servant is discharged by his master for just cause there
is a closer division of authority . There is little reason why a servant,
who by his wilful misconduct gives his master cause to discharge him,
should be allowed a quasi contractual recovery while a servant who wilfully
abandons his employment is refused such recovery, but several courts
make a difference in these cases. 5
Where the master wrongfully and without just cause discharges the
servant, or the servant quits for just cause, the courts almost universally
allow a recovery for part performance by the servant," but the recovery
is upon different theories in England and the United States. English
courts are strict in their requirement that so long as there is a contract
in existence recovery must be on the contract. They require the act of
the master to be such an act as to amount to a repudiation of the contract.
This repudiation is treated by the courts as an offer of rescission, which
may be accepted by the servant. The contract being thus rescinded
the English courts feel themselves at liberty to allow a recovery in
quantum meruit. Baron Parke states the English view in Ehrensperger
v. Anderson' as follows: "In order to constitute a title to recover -or
money had and received, the contract on the one side must not only
be performed or requested to be performed, but there must have been
something equivalent to saying, 'I rescind this contract '-a total refusal
to perform it, or something equivalent to that, which would enable
plaintiff on his side to say, 'If you rescind the contract on your part,
I will rescind it on mine.'" The theory of the American courts is generally
more liberal, allowing a recovery in quasi contracts against the master
who wrongfully discharges his servant even though there is a contract
in existence. This view allows an alternative remedy to the wronged
servant without a consensual rescission, and is adopted in almost all
states. The servant's recovery for breach of contract may be the same
as that in quantum meruit, but it is based on a different theory. The
recovery for the breach of the contract is the amount plaintiff has been
damaged by being prevented from completing his contract. It is harder
to determine such damage than to find the reasonable value of services
rendered. Further, the defendant by breaking his contract has exhibited
an intention to disregard the contract, and a recovery for services rendered
best fulfils the intention of the parties, at least in part.
R,4 The Missouri law on these questions was considered by the Kansas
City Court of Appeals in the recent case of Franklin v. Kast.8 Defendant,
being desirous of purchasing a new car if he could dispose of his old one,
agreed with plaintiff that if he would sell defendant's old car, defendant:
would buy a new one. Plaintiff sold the old one but defendant refused
to buy a new one. The court allowed a recovery in quantum meruit for
the plaintiff's services in selling the old car. The court in a dictum said
that, where a plaintiff under a special contract has performed a service
5. Newman v. Reagan (1879) 63 Ga. 755; (1880) 65 Ga. 512; Abendpost Co. v.Hertel (1896) 67 Il1. App. 501; Hunter v. Litterer & Cabler (Tenn., 1873) 1 Bax. 168.
Compare with cases of same Jurisdictions under note 2, supra.
6. Emmens v. Elderton (1853) 13 C. B. 495, 509; Goodman v. Pocock (1850) 15Q. B. (A. & E.) 576; Prickett v. Badger (1856) 1 C. B. N. 8. 296; Planche v. Colburr(1831) 8 Bing 14; Britt v. Hays (1857) 21 Ga. 157; Old Dominion M'Iining & Smelting
Co v. Andrews (1899) 6 Ariz. 205; James v. Parson (1904) 70 Kan. 156: Mullaly v.
Austin (1867) 97 Mass. 30; Hemminqerv. Western Assurance. Co. (1893) 95Mlch.355;
Welch v. Livingston (1900) 67 N. Y. Supp. 149; Colburn v. Woodworth (N. Y., 1860)
31 Barb. 381.
7. (1848) 3 Exch. 148.
8. (1913) 157 S. W. 841.
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which is of benefit to defendant, and has failed fully to comply with his
contract, he can recover in quantum meruit the value, not to exceed the
contract price, less damage caused by the breach.
As to the decision in that case there seems to be no question. There
was a complete refusal to perform, which under the English rule would
be sufficient to amount to a repudiation. Under the American view it
constituted a substantial breach on the part of the employer, and gave
the employee the right to elect to sue in quantum meruit, or for the breach
of the contract. The earlier Missouri cases support the actual decision
in the case (as distinguidshed from the dictum)whether the relation between
plaintiff and defendant be that of master and servant,' or principal and
agent, 0 when the agent has expended time and money in preparing for
the performance of his agency.
In support of the dictum the court cites the case of Yeats v. Ballentine.1'
That case was one in which plaintiff agreed to do certain plumbing
work according to specifications. He did not properly do the work and
defendant refused to pay. Plaintiff was allowed a recovery in quantum
meruit. Such a contract is generally classed as a building contract.
There is a similar division of authority in such cases as was found to
exist in the cases of service contracts, some courts allowing the breacher
to recover, but probably the majority refusing to allow such recovery. 12
Missouri in a long line of cases has allowed the breacher of such a contract
to recover for part performance." The Missouri courts, however, have
refused to apply the doctrine of Britton v. Turner in the case of service
contracts. 4 The position of the Missouri courts with regard to service
contracts was thus stated by Rombauer, J.:11 "There is no hardship
in parties being held to their contracts. Fair dealing between man
and man seems to require that a person should be aware that a
wilful violation of his own obligation releases the other party to
the contract from corresponding obligations. No rule of ethics seems
to demand that persons should be released from forfeiture wantonly and
wilfully incurred. * * * To hold that a party in such event, can
still recover would be to hold that the law raises an implied contract in
direct opposition to the contract made by the parties themselves." The
dictum, therefore, in Franklin Motor Car Co. v. Kast would seem to be
in conflict with the established law in this state as to service contracts,
being based upon authority with regard to the so-called building contracts,
and so brings sharply to our attention the diametrically opposite results
reached by the Missouri courts when breachers of these very similar kinds
of contracts are seeking to recover quasi contractually.
K. B.
LIABILITY OF CITY FOR DEATH OF CHILD DROWNED IN UNGUARDED
POND IN A CITY PARK.-Generally the owner of real estate is under no
duty to keep his grounds in such condition as not to endanger the safety
of trespassers.' His duty is "not to actively attack them, not to set
9. Dictum In Ream v. Watkins (1858) 27 Mo. 516: Ehrlich v. The Aetna Life
Ins Co. (1885) 88 Mo. 249; McCormick v. Fidelity & Guar Co. (1905) 114 Mo. App. 460.
10. Glover v. Henderson (1893) 120 Mo. 367,377.
11. (1874) 56 Mo. 530.
12. Woodward, Quasi Contracts, § 175.
13. Lee v. Ashbrook (1851) 14 Mo. 379; Eyerman v. Cemetery Assn. (1876) 61
Mo. 491; Creamer v. Bates (1872) 49 Mo. 525; Marsh v. Richards (1859) 29 Mo. 99,
105.
14. Earp v. Tyler (1881) 73 Mo. 617; Linder v. Brewery & Ice Co. (1908) 131
Mo. App. 680; Strach v. McClintock (1907) 128 Mo. App. 368; Henson v. Hampton
(1862) 32 Mo. 408; Aaron v. Moore (1863) 34 Mo. 79.
15. Gruetzner v. Aude Furniture Co. (1887) 28 Mo. App. 263.
1. Dobbins v. M. K. & T. R. Co. (Tex., 1897) 41 S. W. 62; West v. Shaw (Wash.,
1911) 112 Pac. 243; Henry v. Diskow Mining Co. (Mo. App., 1910) 128 S. W. 841;
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traps for them, and not to subject them to harm through wilful and
reckless misconduct."'
The landowner is liable to licensees only for gross negligence,3 but is
under a duty to use ordinary care towards those invited on his premises,
either expressly or impliedly.
4
In this latter division are those cases involving the so-called "turn-
table doctrine." As was well stated in a Kansas case,' "the common
law does not permit the owner of private grounds to keep thereon allure-
ments to the natural instincts of human and animal kinds, without
taking reasonable precautions to insure the safety of such as may be
attracted thereby to his premises. To maintain in one's property entice-
ments to the ignorant or unwary is tantamount to an invitation to visit,
to inspect and to enjoy; and in such cases the obligation to endeavor to
protect from the dangers of the seductive instrument or place, follows as
justly as though the invitation had been express."
This is the basis for the decisions in the so-called "turntable cases."
6
This doctrine, which is admittedly a very humane rule, though perhaps
not strictly logical, has been applied in cases where the injuries were
caused by agencies of a totally different character from turntables, or
even from machinery of any kind. Thus an Illinois court has applied the
doctrine to a case where a child fell into an unguarded pond on a lot
controlled by the defendant.' In a Pennsylvania case
s 
recovery was
allowed where a loading platform fell on a child; and similarly a city was
held liable in a Mississippi case,2 in which it had not guarded an excava-
tion which it had made.
But in a Missouri case1" the doctrine was not applied where a child
fell down a hay chute. Similarly an Iowa case" did not allow recovery
where a child was injured in machinery in a canning factory annex. In
a Michigan case 2 a street car left unguarded was held not to be so attrac-
tive to children that a child injured by it could recover, and a Missouri
case
13 
would not apply the doctrine where a child was injured by a lumber
pile falling on him. A Tennessee case 4 would not allow a boy to recover
Klienberg v. Schwem (1909) 119 N. Y. Supp. 239; Sutton v. West Jersey etc. By. Co.
(N..1909) 73 Atl. 256; Kelly v. Benas (1909) 217 Mo. 1.
2. McDermott v. Benke (1912) 256 Ill. 401: Butler v. By. Co. (Mo. App., 1911)
136 S. W. 729; Gordon v. Roberts (Cal., 1912) 123 Pac. 288.
3. Upp v. Darner (Iowa, 1911) 130 N. W. 409; Stelter v. Cordes (1911) 130
N. Y. Supp. 688; Hill v. President & Trustees (Or., 1912) 121 Pac. 901; C. C. C. &
St. L. By. Co. v. Jones (Ind., 1912) 99 N. E. 503; Pentell v. P & R. Coal & Iron Co.
(1912) 256 Ill. 110.
4. Newinyham v. J. C. Blair Co. (1911) 232 Pa. 511; Reynolds v. By. Co. (Mo.
App., 1912) 142 S. W. 1097; Christopher Co. v. Russell (Fla., 1912) 58 So. 45; Marston
v. Beynolds (1912) 211 Mas. 590; Graham v. Shoe Co. (Mo. App., 1912) 147 S. W.
165; Petty v. Stiebins (1911) 164 111. App. 439; Purtell v. P. & R. Coal & Iron Co., supra.
5. Price v. Water Co. (1897) 58 Kan. 551.
6. By. Co. v. Stout (1873) 17 Wall. 657; Koons v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. (1877)
65 Mo. 476; U. P. By. Co. v. Dunden (1887) 37 Kan. 1; San Antonio etc. By. Co. v
Morgan (Ind. Ter., 1898) 45 S. W. 141; Berry v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. (1908) 214
Mo. 215; Lewis v. C. C. C. & St. L. By. Co. (Ind., 1908) 84 N. E. 23; Stallery v. Cicero
& P. St. By. Co. (111., 1910) 90 N. E. 709. Contra: Thomason v. Son. By. (1902) 113
Fed. 80; Turess v. N. Y. etc. & Western R. R. Co. (1898) 61 N. J. L. 314; Walker's
Admrs. v. Potomac, etc. R. Co. (Va., 1906) 53 So. 113; Wheeling, etc. R. Co. v. Hawly
(Ohio, 1907) 83 N. E. 66; Sworts v. Akron Water Works Co. (Ohio, 1907) 83 N. E. 66;
Reid v. Harmon (Mich., 1910) 125 N. W. 761: Berg. v. Duluth etc. By. Co. (Minn.,
1910) 126 N. W. 1095.
7. City of Pekin v. M4-cAFahon, Admr. (1895) 154 Ill. 141.
8. Hydraulic Wks. Co. v. Orr (1877) 83 Pa. 332.
9. Mackey v. Mayor etc. of Vicksburg (1887) 2 So. 178.
10. Marcheck v. Klute (1908) 133 Mo. App. 280.
11. Brown v. Rockwell City Canning Co. (1906) 110 N. W. 12.
12. Kammier v. City Elec. By. Co. (1898) 116 Mich. 306.
13. Kelly v. Benas (1909) 217 Mo. 1.
14. Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Ray (1911) 134 S. W. 858.
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who had fallen off a freight car on which he had climbed, and an Illinois
case
5 held that a coal wagon in use was not an attractive object within
the meaning of the "turntable doctrine."
A Utah case"5 would restrict the application of the doctrine to in-
stances in which the machinery was at rest, "not being used in the course
of business."
As we have seen, by some courts the doctrine has been applied to
"places attractive to children," 17 as distinguished from "machinery
attractive to children," and such an application was attempted in the recent
Missouri case of Clapp v. City of St. Louis.5 In this case the plaintiffs
sought to recover for the death of their minor son, who was drowned in a
pool in Forest Park. The evidence was undisputed to the effect that the
pool was unguarded. Woodson, J., in his opinion said, "The uncontra-
dicted evidence shows that Forest Park was a public resort for men,
women and children, and that thousands visited it daily, especially
children, boys and girls; also that they were in the habit of * * *
playing on and about the steps at the mouth of the sewer, where there
was a pool of water from eight to twelve feet deep in the center. * * *
This pool had existed for years, and unquestionably the city had know-
ledge of its existence. * * * The park being a public place, and
containing this unguarded pool of water, and frequented by many children,
young and indiscreet, at the invitation of the city, who we all know are
greatly attracted by pools of water, bubbling brooks and running streams,
made the situation highly attractive and dangerous to any and all children
who might approach the place and play in or about the stream and pool."
Thus the place was attractive to children. But as Woodson, J., points
out, the turntable doctrine did not apply. He says in part: "That
rule has no application whatever to this case or the class of cases to
which it belongs. In this case the injury occurred, and of necessity
must occur, at a place where the injured party had both the legal and
moral right to be, while in the turntable cases the injury occurred, and
of necessity must have occurred, on private property, a place where the
injured person had no legal right to be, but was induced to go there by
an attractive piece of machinery or other matters equally attractive to
children." Thus since the deceased in the principal case was not a tres-
passer the turntable cases do not apply. But a city must use such care
as a prudent person would in guarding such dangerous conditions as
here existed, 9 and in the absence of such reasonable precautions the city
is liable. Hence the case undoubtedly reaches the correct result in
allowing a recovery.
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